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Abstract
This article draws on in-depth, qualitative interviews with Muslim and non-Muslim Ameri-
cans in 2016 to specify how Muslim “racialization” is shaped by the racial politics of the 
United States (US). Anti-Muslim bias is not experienced by religious Muslims as a whole, 
but by people whose bodies are read to be affiliated with the Islamic religion—often erro-
neously—because of their perceived racial characteristics. Self-identified black, white, and 
Hispanic Muslims with no visible markers of their religion do not experience anti-Muslim 
harassment, while non-Muslim Christians, Hindus, and Sikhs who embody an imagined 
“Muslim look,” cope with fear and aggression from strangers on a daily basis. These find-
ings are notable for two reasons. First, our respondents demonstrate how racialized religion 
is mutable: they are active in constructing how Islam is read on their bodies in public. Sec-
ond, our findings demonstrate how hate crime categorization in the US obscures the role 
that racism plays in religious victimization. We urge scholars who study anti-Muslim acts 
to include non-Muslims in their analyses, and advocate for the re-conceptualization of iden-
tity-based hate crime categories. Excavating the corporeality of criminal victimization in 
particular can help to understand  the ways in which biases are experienced in the contem-
porary US.
They could care less that I am calling myself a Muslim. All they look at is the dark 
skin. That is how I am judged. That is how we are all judged, as black people.
– Joshua, black Muslim man
I am perceived to an American as Muslim. If I walk down the street I’ll get yelled at, 
“Hey, Bin Laden, how are you doing?” Or “Osama.” And it will happen all the time.
—Hari, (non-Muslim) Sikh man
 This article joins ongoing critical conversations about violence labeled “hate” or “bias” 
crime (Chakraborti 2010, 2015, 2016; Jacobs and Potter 1998; Mason 2014; McDevitt and 
Iwama 2016;  McVeigh et  al. 2003; Meyer 2014; Moran 2001). Drawing from in-depth, 
qualitative interviews with Muslim and non-Muslim Americans in 2016, we specify the 
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ways in which religious bias acts are “raced” in the current era. We find that self-identified 
black, white, and Hispanic Muslims do not experience anti-Muslim harassment, while non-
Muslim Sikhs, Hindus, and Christians who are perceived to be Muslim regularly suffer 
such acts. These findings are notable for two reasons. First, our respondents demonstrate 
how racialized religion is mutable; Muslims and non-Muslims are active in constructing 
how Islam is read on their bodies in public. While critical criminologists have explored the 
ways in which race and gender performance impacts victimization (cf. Campbell 2005), 
religious performance has not been explored. Second, our findings show that state hate 
crime categories in the United States (US) obscure the role that race plays in religious vic-
timization. This not only confuses the statistical portrait of hate victimization in the US, but 
also reifies the racial assumptions embedded in the symbolic “honor” of being protected by 
hate crime legislation. Instead, the corporeality of criminal victims (Spencer 2015) should 
be excavated in order to understand how bias is experienced in the contemporary US.
Figures  1, 2, 3 and 4 summarize our argument. Figures  1 and 2 show how the US 
government conceptualizes hate crimes, while Figs.  3 and 4 offer our corrections. The 
US Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) organizes hate crimes in four major categories in 
Fig. 1. According to BJS data, the most common type of hate crime in the US in 2016 was 
motivated by the victim’s race or ethnicity; second and third most common was victims’ 
religion (21%) and sexual orientation/gender identity (20%), respectively, while a much 
smaller group was targeted because of disability.1 This distribution is fairly consistent with 
data from the last decade, although the total number of hate crimes increased significantly 
each year in 2015, 2016, and 2017.2
Race/ethnicity
(58%)
Orientaon/
(1%)
Fig. 1  BJS hate crimes by victims’ identity
1 This is among what the FBI calls “single-category” bias incidents, or 6063 out of 6121. See the FBI’s 
reports at: https ://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime /2016 and https ://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime /2016/topic -pages /victi ms.
2 See Masucci and Langton (2017) for more detail on hate crimes from 2004 to 2015.
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Figure 2 focuses on the victims of religiously-motivated hate crimes, this article’s topic. 
According to the BJS, Jews were targets of religious hate crimes more than any other reli-
gious group in 2016 (54% of religious hate crimes), followed by Muslims (25% of religious 
hate crimes), and then all other religions. This, too, is consistent with data from the past 
Fig. 2  BJS hate crimes by victims’ religion
Chrisan
Hindu
Sikh
Muslim
’
Fig. 3  Anti-Muslim crimes by victims’ religion
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decade, though anti-Muslim crime has increased proportionately more than crime against 
other religious groups each year since 2014 (Kishi 2017; Levin 2018).
Our data problematize the above two figures. While many have acknowledged that 
federal hate crime statistics are not reliable in terms of sheer numbers (including the BJS 
itself3), our data suggest additional problems. First, “Muslim hate crimes” are not commit-
ted against religious Muslims as a whole. As other studies have shown, anti-Muslim acts 
in the twenty-first century US are committed against a group of people who are religiously 
Muslim, Sikh, Christian and Hindu (Cainkar 2009; Cainkar and Maira 2005; CAIR 2017; 
Jamal and Naber 2008; Joshi 2006; Love 2017; Meer 2013; Meer and Modood 2010; Rana 
2011; Selod and Embrick 2013; Singh 2002; Singh et al. 2013; Verma 2006; Zainiddinov 
2016; Zopf 2017). This is represented in Fig. 3.
But because bias against Muslims is also “racialized” (Bayoumi 2006; Cainkar and 
Selod 2018; Chen 2010; Considine 2017; Elver 2012; Garner and Selod 2015; Love 2017; 
Meer and Modood 2010; Selod 2015; Selod and Embrick 2013), this group (“Muslim hate 
crimes”) can be further specified, demonstrating another problem with the BJS categories. 
First, “race” and “religious” bias crimes are not so easily distinguished, making the catego-
rization scheme itself misleading. Second, the Muslim, Sikh, Christian and Hindu Ameri-
cans who are targets of anti-Muslim violence, experience anti-Muslim bias in the public 
sphere in a variety of ways. According to our interviewees, their racial-religious identities 
are both performed using changing, conscious strategies on a daily basis, and interpreted 
through the “gaze” of those with whom they interact. The interactions that result, in turn, 
influence whether or not they will be targeted as Muslim. This article joins with others 
in suggesting that the historical ethno-racial arrangements in the US must be taken into 
Arab
’
Asian
without
“Muslim”
African-
with
“Muslim”
Fig. 4  Anti-Muslim crimes by victims’ race/ethnicity
3 See the 2015 report at https ://www.bjs.gov/conte nt/pub/press /hcv04 15pr.cfm.
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account to  specify how racialization shapes anti-Muslim acts in the twenty-first century 
(Cainkar and Selod 2018, Love 2017). Figure 4 shows the group of people who experience 
anti-Muslim acts, according to our research. This group identifies racially as “Arab” and 
as “South Asian,” but is also composed of white, black, and Hispanic Americans who are 
perceived to be wearing Islamic “dress.” White, black, and Hispanic Muslims who do not 
wear markers of their religion notably do not experience discrimination.
Though our respondent group is small and our research should be considered prelimi-
nary, it has two important implications for critical criminologists. First, those who study 
hate crimes should be cautious about conducting research on identity-based violence using 
populations defined by pre-articulated categories; instead, identity should be treated as 
something to be constructed, with data gathered from a broad population rather than “sam-
pling on the dependent variable,” as sociologists say.4 Second, we argue that by dissemi-
nating uncritically statistics about “Muslim” hate crimes, criminologists obscure the long 
history of state-sponsored racism that is complicit with those who suppose that they can 
read religion on the bodies of those whom they encounter. The 3.5 million Muslims who 
live in the United States describe themselves as white (30%), black (23%), Asian (21%), 
Hispanic (6%), and other or mixed race (19%) (Mohamed 2016, 2018). Despite this diver-
sity, a homogenous racial imaginary surrounds Islam, conflating Muslims with the “Arab 
terrorist” category that consolidated after 9/11. This imaginary is known to Muslim and 
“Muslim-looking” Americans, and it is actively manipulated according to our interview-
ees’ goals and beliefs. Black, white, and Hispanic Americans fall outside of this imagi-
nary—their racial identity either criminalized—in the case of black respondents—or privi-
leged  in the case of  respondents who identify as white. Critical victimologists interested 
in the contemporary US should attend to the intersection of embodied racial and religious 
positions in the context of not only the post-9/11 history, but also in the longer history of 
black/white racialization.
Muslim Hate in the Age of Trump
On November 8, 2016, Donald J. Trump became the 45th President of the United States 
after running a campaign that, among other things, encouraged anti-Muslim sentiment. 
He said, “I think Islam hates us” and called for “a total and complete shutdown of Mus-
lims entering the United States” (Johnson and Hauslohner 2017). In the months following 
Trump’s election, bias incidents of all types spiked, including those against Muslims. The 
Southern Poverty Law Center documented nearly 900 bias incidents in one week, report-
ing that they were different in quality, as well as quantity, from those documented before 
Trump’s election. One target of bias described the incidents as more aggressive and less 
“ashamed” than ever before (Miller and Werner-Winslow 2016).
Although Trump’s rhetoric brought the discussion about Muslims in America 
to the forefront of political discourse, anti-Muslim sentiment is by no means new 
in the US. Religious Jews and Muslims have a long history of outsider status  in the 
Christian world, going back at least as far as fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Spain 
4 Commonly defined as selecting a group to study because the participants meet particular criteria and then 
using the findings as evidence for the criteria (King et al. 1994).
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(Fredrickson 2002; Rana 2011). Any exploration the topic of Americans’ positions 
on Islam must  also acknowledge the complex histories of European colonialism and 
US-led imperialism in Arab homelands (Naber 2008). Edward Said (1978) first docu-
mented how the colonial “gaze” created a false idea of the “Oriental” population it 
encountered in its nineteenth-century Asian incursions. This gaze homogenized dis-
parate foreign cultures as singularly passive, exotic and inferior. In the late twentieth 
century, ideas about Muslims were further complicated by the Arab–Israeli geopoliti-
cal conflict, which had the effect of conflating “Arab” with “danger” in mainstream US 
discourse, and sometimes conflating people of Arab descent with people of “Muslim” 
faith (Cainkar 2009; Nacos and Torres-Reyna 2003). The American response to 9/11 
further complicated this, helping to bring to the mainstream the idea that the religion of 
Islam itself is dangerous. Even before that, Samuel Huntington’s (1993) thesis posited 
that the global conflict of the twenty-first century would be structured by a fundamen-
tal incompatibility between the cultures of the “West” and the “non-West”—what he 
called the “clash of civilizations.” The mainstream media largely ignored these types 
of arguments until after 9/11, when the organizations who had been espousing anti-
Islamic rhetoric caught the attention of the media. By 2005, this “fringe” discourse had 
achieved mainstream circulation (Bail 2015). The term “Islamophobia” gained popular 
usage in the West during this period, marking the entrance of a specific type of “fear” 
of Islam into public discourse (Allen 2010).
In the twenty-first century, Muslim has become synonymous with terrorism in media 
(Altheide 2006), political (Harvey 2003; Welch 2004), and public discourse in the US 
(Alsultany 2013; Welch 2006). Situating the Islamic religion as dangerous to Western val-
ues is impossibly essentialist, requiring the homogenization of 1.6 billion people spread 
out across all regions of the globe and belonging to dozens of different sects and schools 
of theology, but it performs the work of supporting an old colonialist narrative obscuring 
the everyday violence of Western imperial nations (Asad 2007; Tuastad 2003; Turner and 
Nasir 2013) and, as such, has many iterations. One effect of this particular strain of Islamo-
phobia is that people who are imagined to be Muslim are harassed daily, impacting those 
who “look” Muslim, rather than an actual religious group. Shortly after 9/11, a reporter 
described what she called a “Muslim look” to describe the young men in their twenties 
or thirties from Egypt, Pakistan, or Saudi Arabia who were being profiled as suspected 
terrorists (Davis 2001). In the more than 15 years since, people targeted as Muslim have 
included Sikhs (Ahluwalia and Pellettiere 2010; Joshi 2006; Singh 2002; Singh et al. 2013; 
Verma 2006), Arabs (Cainkar 2009; Cainkar and Maira 2005; Jamal and Naber 2008), and 
others perceived to be “Middle Eastern” (Love 2017; Welch 2006). Scholars frame the tar-
geting of people perceived as Muslim to be the “racialization of religion”—a process by 
which a group of religious people become associated with phenotypical and cultural char-
acteristics that are deemed unchanging and hereditary (Bayoumi 2006; Cainkar and Selod 
2018; Chen 2010; Considine 2017; Elver 2012; Garner and Selod 2015; Love 2017; Meer 
and Modood 2010; Rana 2011; Selod 2015; Selod and Embrick 2013; Singh 2002; Singh 
et al. 2013; Verma 2006; Zainiddinov 2016; Zopf 2017). This has been described as part 
of a longer history of the racialization of non-white groups in the modern West (Omi and 
Winant 1994). According to the racialization of religion thesis, Muslims might be consid-
ered to be one of a group of “collective blacks” (Bonilla-Silva 2015), surveilled in much 
the same way blacks have been (Browne 2015). Our research suggests that this would 
be too broad a generalization—that Muslims of some ethno-racial groups are treated as 
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potential terrorists to be surveilled, but that others are invisible as Muslims, either because 
of their white racial privilege or because those perceived to be black are not imagined to be 
part of a “foreign” religious group. This is notably different from the experience of black 
Muslims in Western Europe, where Islam is associated with immigration from, among 
other places, northern Africa (Mythen et al. 2008). As such, we join with recent scholars 
who have called for clarification of the intersectional processes that “mark” a person Mus-
lim in the public eye (Cainkar and Selod 2018).
Our data show that hate crime statistics erase how racial prejudices inform religious 
victimization. Anti-Muslim acts are not suffered by religious Muslims as a whole, but 
by people whose bodies are read in public to be affiliated with Islam because of their 
perceived racial characteristics. Joining with other scholars in critical victimology 
(Mawby and Walklate 1994; Spencer and Walklate 2016;  Walklate 2006), we dem-
onstrate that state definitions of victimization not only differ from the ways in which 
people experience it, but also reify the categories that enable a racialized culture of 
control.
Drawing on Butler (1990), theories of racial performance examine how individuals 
actively bring their “race into being” (Peek 2005). Racial identities—as all aspects of 
the presentation of self (Goffman 1963)—are produced actively in everyday activities. 
Choices of clothing, language, and posture are implicated in this construction. For peo-
ple perceived as Muslim, decisions about shaving one’s facial hair, wearing a turban or 
hijab, or altering an accent can have implications for their perceived racial identity (Patel 
2005). Race, in this sense, is not a static identity, but a continual process of negotia-
tion and performance. This also complicates the notion of racial “passing.” While racial 
minorities have historically used “passing” as a mode of protection (cf. Sanchez and 
Schlossberg 2001), some of our respondents “pass” due to the overlay of a more stig-
matized identity: their blackness renders them invisible as Muslims in this sense. New 
scholarship in the sociology of religion interrogates how religious identities, too, are per-
formed (Mellor and Schilling 2010), but critical victimology has yet to take up the ques-
tion of how performed religious identities impact bias acts. As such, the case of Muslim 
hate crime in the United States intensifies the need to study the corporeality of victimiza-
tion—the “embodied preconditions of agency” as Spencer (2015) says—as opposed to 
the identity categories supplied by the state.
Research Methods
From May through September, during the presidential election season of 2016, the 
authors and five collaborators interviewed Americans in a major Southwest city about 
the candidates’ stated positions on Muslims and Islam. Like Abrams and colleagues 
(2004), we were interested in capturing the way that meaning is created as important 
events unfold, recording “culture on the street” before positions become ossified in pol-
icy (2004: 194, citing Williams 1977). We wanted to understand if and how respondents 
were engaging with the presidential candidates’ declarations about the religion of Islam 
and Muslim people. Using a semi-structured, open-ended approach common to quali-
tative sociological interviewing that aims to develop respondent-centered data (Weiss 
1995), we tracked how meaning is created, rather than imposing meaning ourselves. We 
asked all respondents questions about four general topics: (1) What have you heard about 
Islam during the presidential campaign? (2) Does this conversation remind you of others 
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in history? (3) How did you form your ideas about Islam? (4) Have you ever experienced 
fear around these issues? We did not ask specifically about hate crimes or experiences 
with discriminatory incidents, but many respondents offered experiences with these in 
the course of the interviews.
Our aim was to capture the full spectrum of possible responses to the candidates’ talk 
about Islam. To build our respondent pool, we used theory-driven purposeful sampling 
(Patton 2002). Previous literature suggests that in the US, religion and political affiliation 
affect opinions of Islam (Pew 2014, 2016). Therefore, our primary sampling goal was to 
ensure that a wide range of religious affiliations was represented, while also paying atten-
tion to political affiliation. Over the course of 4 months, we conducted thirty focus groups 
with a total of 89 people, and interviewed 83 people individually. In total, 172 people par-
ticipated in our research. We collected basic demographic data from respondents in order 
to assure a diversity of age, ethnicity, political affiliations, race and socioeconomic posi-
tions. As such, any racial identifications we use in this article were supplied by respondents 
themselves. All interview and focus groups were recorded and transcribed professionally, 
which we then coded using NVIVO software for qualitative analysis.5
For this article, data from 33 respondents were analyzed. These included participants 
who identified as Muslim (26), Sikh (4), Christian (2), and Hindu (1), and who described 
themselves as having been victims of anti-Muslim biases. The respondents in this group 
ranged in age from nineteen to over 80 years-old, and included seventeen women and six-
teen men.
Findings: Experiencing Hate
This section presents findings from the 33 respondents in our study who identified as Mus-
lim and/or described experiencing anti-Muslim bias. Twenty-three of these told interview-
ers that they were targets of anti-Muslim acts, while six Muslims said they had never been 
targets of anti-Muslim sentiment in public, and four did not volunteer any information 
about their experiences one way or another. These findings are captured in Fig. 5.
As interviewers sat in people’s homes, coffee shops, and religious institutions, we heard 
the stories of harassment from those who practice the Muslim faith and others who were 
only believed to be Muslim by strangers. Some of the stories left the respondent emotion-
ally scarred, while others told their stories as ordinary, factual incidents. All, however, 
described the ways in which their physical form was read in public spaces. We take these 
bodily experiences “as a site of truth” (Spencer 2015: 37) in understanding anti-Muslim 
victimization.
We present our findings in three parts. First, we introduce respondents who experience 
their vulnerability as inevitable by nature of their religious embodiment: Sikhs wearing 
5 We used small focus groups and one-on-one interviews typical of a mixed-methods study, ranging from 
40 minutes to over two hours. In one-on-one interviews, we emphasized life history narratives in order 
to understand the development of respondents’ beliefs and experiences. In focus groups, we were able to 
develop group knowledge in an attempt to observe the dynamic built among participants (Wilkinson 1999). 
We employed a “mini” focus group methodology (Morgan 1997), with two to five people from shared 
social groups, so that participants would be “highly involved” both with one another and with the interview 
material.
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turbans (4) and Muslim women who wear hijabs (6) describe the most consistent and har-
rowing experiences. For this group, embodiment is not a choice to be negotiated, but pre-
scribed by their religious faith. Second, we discuss 13 other men and women who con-
sciously alter  their phenotypical Muslim “look” as a method of negotiating anti-Muslim 
prejudice. We then turn to the accounts of the six “invisible” Muslim respondents who 
reported no experience with public acts of bias, focusing on their explanations about racial 
performance.
Immutable Bodies
Out of the 23 respondents who described experiencing anti-Muslim acts in public spaces, 
ten spoke of  the presentation of their religious identity as immutable. For this group—
the six hijabi women and four Sikh respondents—the act of covering their heads was non-
negotiable. This marker of faith—the head covering—notably erased racial and religious 
privilege. Self-described white, brown, and black women were targets of anti-Muslim acts 
in public because of their hijabs; and turban-wearing Sikhs, though most closely related to 
the Hindu religion, were targeted as potential Muslim terrorists.
Claire is a white woman in her forties who converted to Islam. Putting on the “scarf,” 
she explained, was a serious undertaking for her, but one that she could not delay once she 
felt herself to be “truly” Muslim. Claire explained: “I didn’t wear a scarf because I knew it 
was going to be a challenge, that going to Walmart would be a challenge, going to work … 
and my family.” But once she felt “confident” as a Muslim, she had to wear the scarf. The 
9
6
4
3
Reported Bias Incidents (N=23)
Muslim, phenotypical Muslim look
Muslim, Muslim clothing
Non-Muslim, "Muslim look" clothing
Non-Muslim, phenotypical" Muslim look"
4
3
2
1
No Report of Bias Incidents (N=10)
Muslim, phenotypical Muslim look.Not asked
black Muslim, no "Muslim look"
white Muslim, no "Muslim look"
Hispanic Muslim, no "Muslim look"
Fig. 5  Interviewees’ experiences with anti-Muslim incidents (N = 33)
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consequences were as bad as she imagined. Her brothers and sisters taunted her mercilessly 
during family gatherings. Claire recounted what they said about her:
‘She became part of a terrorist group. She’s a Muslim terrorist. She joined a cult. 
We’ve got to watch out because she might have a bomb in her car.’ Things like this. 
‘She may have a bomb or a machete under her scarf. Watch out. She might have a 
machete under there. Here comes the rag-head.’ Very painful things.
Claire also lost her job because the manager disapproved of her “new appearance.” She 
accused Claire of taking too many breaks to “cool down” from it. Rather than consider 
taking off the hijab, however, Claire considered it “God’s way” of getting her away from 
an unholy place. Claire also said that the 2016 presidential election heightened her fear of 
public spaces, making her wonder if someone would “shoot up” her home or run her off 
the road while she was driving. Claire was especially attuned to changes in her level of fear 
because she had experienced a significant amount of her life without it. Growing up as a 
white Christian woman, she understood that her choice to wear the hijab on a regular basis 
removed her ability to perform whiteness (Smith 2014) in a way that protected her.
Another hijabi respondent was a spokesperson for a Muslim organization, which put her 
in the public eye. As a “visible” Muslim, Fatima said, her daily routines included precau-
tions against physical and verbal attacks. She was late to meet for our interview because 
she was checking her surroundings, parking and walking onto a college campus in the mid-
dle of a weekday:
I take precautions. Like right now, I was sitting in the car. I didn’t see anybody. A 
couple of times, I went back. I parked again. Then, I drove over there. I didn’t see 
anybody. I’m not on time even though there is no threat here.
Though she acknowledged there was “no threat” on the campus, Fatima completed her 
usual routine of parking and re-parking, checking and re-checking to prevent against any 
potential attacker that might be following her. Fatima said that the experience of being 
targeted in public had increased in the years after 9/11, but had also become more frequent 
during the 2016 presidential campaign. Fatima described her role as a “visible” Muslim 
as a choice grounded in a desire to help her community. She lives every day with ver-
bal threats and “unbelievable” looks from those who would wish her harm, she said. But 
because of the heightened bias against Muslims, she is determined to be a role model to 
Muslims and non-Muslims alike. As she said, she has to wear the hijab now more than 
ever.
Sayeeda, a black Muslim woman in her twenties, described how everyday events can 
become the site of potential violence  not because of her phenotypical  appearance, but 
because of her hijab. She was in the “most diverse Walmart on Earth” with her sister when 
a man behind her in the checkout line picked up his phone. He began talking loudly about 
terrorists, making clear she and her sister were meant to hear. Sayeeda heard him say:
‘We should just kill all of them. We just need to go over there and just have a big 
bomb and kill them all.’ … I’m like oh my God should I say something. Then my 
sister, she’s like: ‘No, no don’t say anything. What if he tries to do something?’
Her sister urged her to keep quiet and leave, although she wanted to speak up. Not only did 
this display make her feel threatened, she said, but she also felt silenced. For Claire, Fatima, 
and Sayeeda and other women we interviewed, the hijab is part of their identity, an expres-
sion of their faith rather than a choice to be made on a daily basis. In this way, the hijab 
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shares characteristics typically associated with a racial identity: it is written on the body, 
inseparable from its wearer.
These women’s experiences are similar to the group of four turban-wearing Sikhs we 
interviewed. Like Muslim women who wear a hijab, this group recounted consistently har-
rowing occurrences in public spaces. Hari, the man quoted at the beginning of this article, 
discussed how people hurl anti-Muslim insults at him when he is walking down the street. 
This anti-Muslim hatred is normal for him, he explained, and that it happens “all the time.” 
Ahmed, another Sikh man who is in his forties, describes the animus that goes along with 
being read as a Muslim:
Often times I’ve heard, ‘Hey terrorist, get out of our country.’ It’s the underlying 
assumption that people have, ‘You must be Muslim and you must be bad.’
Despite this misrecognition, none of our Sikh interviewees considered removing the tur-
ban. One told us that his move to the United States and subsequent harassment made him 
research why he wore a turban. Amar said that the negative attention he received made him 
seek answers to why he was required to wear it. Based on his readings, Amar concluded: 
“I’m a Sikh, which means I’m a prince. That’s why I wear a turban.” Amar believed that 
his religious identity meant that he should embody royalty and wear a crown of sorts. He 
did not consider taking it off again.
Although traditionally defined in terms of phenotype, scholars recognize that mode of 
dress is increasingly considered part of the process of racialization. For Muslims and 
Sikhs, in particular, unfamiliar modes of dress mark their owners as foreign and non-white 
in the United States (Joshi 2006; Meer and Modood 2010; Rana 2011; Selod and Embrick 
2013; Zopf 2017). Despite the risks, this group of respondents described the markers of 
their faith as expressions of their dedication. 
Alterable Identities
Others in our group of interviewees offered their experiences with discrimination as “every 
day,” but also within some realm of their control. Michael, a Muslim Middle Eastern man 
in his twenties, described his ongoing decisions about whether or not to shave his beard. 
As a self-described “brown” man, people in Michael’s life push him to shave his beard in 
order to obscure his “Muslim look.” He explained:
When I video call my mom and I have a big beard she gets scared a lot: ‘You have to 
shave your beard. Shave your beard!’ Sometimes people make jokes between us like, 
‘Come on shave your beard. People will think you are a terrorist!’
This is not a “joke” Michael appreciates. The decision to shave—a grooming decision usu-
ally left to oneself—invites comments from his mother and friends, but it is also one that 
has real and potentially serious consequences for him. He considers how “safe” he feels in 
a given situation and alters his appearance accordingly.
Saleem, a young man whose parents emigrated from Pakistan, also alters the way he 
embodies his religion. When he was younger, he told us, strangers were “either suspicious 
or they’re extra nice.” He remembered negotiating hostility, on the one hand, and curiosity, 
on the other. After 9/11, especially, Saleem said, he lived with a constant threat of violence. 
Though he himself had never been beaten up—a result of his large size, he speculated—he 
said that as a Muslim, “You always hear about [other Muslims] getting beat up.” This put 
him on edge constantly, even for the “day-to-day stuff.” He was aware of how strangers 
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talk to him when dining in a restaurant or walking down the street. He became attuned 
to “a little difference in tone” giving him “this little pinching feeling on the back of [his] 
neck” that he had to be prepared to defend himself. Like Sayeeda’s sister, Saleem’s parents 
warned him not to bring attention to himself but to keep quiet in order to stay safe. Unlike 
Sayeeda, however, he found it too difficult to live with constant restraint and became an 
activist, requiring a type of Muslim embodiment similar to that described by Fatima—that 
of a “professional Muslim,” as he called it. Though he did not question whether to shave 
his beard like Michael, he made different adjustments in public, maintaining his body as a 
receptacle for non-Muslim’s queries. Saleem describes the energy it takes to gain control 
of dialogues about Muslims in the company of non-Muslims. Whether he is giving a for-
mal talk or just meeting new people in his work, he works against being perceived as the 
stereotypical angry, violent Muslim. To his discomfort, he described, he allows others to 
direct questions and set agendas in order to perform the role of a good “representative” 
of his religion. To some degree, Michael and Saleem experience their racialized religious 
identity as mutable. They change their bodily habits to accommodate the negative percep-
tions of Islam, performing  different type  of work than that  described by the turban  and 
hijab-wearing respondents. This, they hope, will stave off potential attacks.
Invisible Muslims
There is limited research about Muslims who do not experience anti-Islamic bias in public. 
Six Muslims we interviewed fit this category. They identified as black (3), white (2), and 
Hispanic (1); none wore material markers of their faith, such as a hijab or kurta. For some 
of this group, this racial “passing” is a privilege. For others, it is part of a different experi-
ence of discrimination.
Emir identifies as a white, Muslim man. He describes how white Muslims are able to 
enjoy the privileges associated with whiteness if they do not “look Muslim.” Emir is aware 
of the fact that he is not read as Muslim and how this reality is not only connected to race, 
but also gender. He explains:
No one can tell I’m a Muslim from the outside view. But when it comes to the ladies, 
my wife she has the headscarf … when you go to a shopping center, you see that 
people they are looking. You can see the fear in their face. It’s totally different when I 
talk to a seller, or my wife, she talks with them.
Emir does not have any physical signifiers of his Muslim faith. As a white man, he says he 
is able to pass as non-Muslim and avoid anti-Muslim bias. Emir’s wife, however, cannot. 
As he describes, her hijab causes them to be greeted with fear. This confirms others’ find-
ings that the Muslim racialization is gendered (cf. Selod 2018; Williams and Vashi 2007). 
Emir’s experience is different from that of the three black Muslim men we interviewed. 
Joshua, quoted in this article’s introduction, faces discrimination constantly, but not 
because he is Muslim. As he described, strangers “could care less if he is Muslim.” He 
was raised a Christian, but converted to Islam as a young adult.   For Joshua, becoming 
a member of the Nation of Islam meant a tremendous change in the way that he carried 
himself and thought of himself. Being a Muslim meant that he had to “clean up” inside 
and out. But in public spaces in the US, that transformation was invisible to those who saw 
him only as black. As an African-American man born and raised in the US, Joshua says 
he is read first and foremost as a different type of dangerous body, despite the fact that he 
is a middle-aged professional. He describes constant treatment as a “criminalblackman,” 
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Russell-Brown’s (1998) term for the merging of the black male and criminal identities of 
the mass incarceration era. For Joshua, negotiating public space through the eyes of people 
who might fear him is part of his everyday behavior—a habitus that is decades old. This 
was brought into vast relief when he began to travel the world as a member of the US 
military: 
It is funny because we are accepted more overseas as black people than we are here 
in the United States. Whether I am a Muslim or Christian or not. I can go to England, 
Spain, Paris, whatever and get way more respect no matter what my religion is, there 
than I do right here in the country that I was born in, the country that I served in the 
military in.
Joshua fears for his safety as a black man in the US, he explains, but not as a Muslim. 
Further, this fear is grounded specifically in the country he grew up in; it dissipates some-
what when he travels.
Amar, another black Muslim man, is from Nigeria and has an accent when he speaks 
English. He described how these aspects of his identity often prompted strangers to ask 
where he is from. His African heritage does not perturb  people he comes into contact 
with, he explained. But when he mentions his religion, listeners are shocked: “At some 
point in time they find out I’m Muslim and they’re kind of shocked because they have this 
image in their heads of what a Muslim should look like… the Saudi look with the beard.” 
As Amar understands it, Africans and African-Americans in the US do not embody the 
“Muslim look” the way “the Saudi look with a beard” does. Ironically, Americans treat 
these black men with racialized assumptions that obscure any potential bias towards their 
religion. Their religious affiliation is “invisible” in this sense, hidden behind prejudices of 
another sort.
Conclusion
The targets of anti-Muslim violence in the post-9/11 US have been a poorly defined group 
(Cainkar and Selod 2018; Love 2017). Our research shows that this group is composed of 
people from at least four religious faiths and is shaped by the way identity is performed and 
perceived. Muslims and non-Muslims are aware of the “Muslim imaginary” that shapes the 
ways strangers gaze upon them. For some, the way that they embody their religion is not 
a choice to be made on a daily basis. For this group, they will be either targeted or made 
invisible as Muslims on a consistent basis. Others take the racialized gaze into their own 
hands. Whether shaving a beard or adopting the posture of a “professional” Muslim—this 
group of people predict that their corporeal expression will change the way that they are 
targeted. Arabs and South Asians are most likely to be targeted for anti-Islamic harassment 
regardless of their religious faith, as is anyone wearing what is perceived to be Islamic 
head coverings. This especially impacts women who wear hijabs in the US, as others have 
confirmed see, e.g., Selod 2018; and Williams and Vashi 2007). Our research also sug-
gests that white, Hispanic, and black Muslims with no perceived “Muslim” clothing are 
less likely to experience anti-Muslim harassment in the contemporary US. In order to be 
confirmed, this research should be replicated on a larger scale. It is also important to com-
pare these findings with evidence from the EU, where Muslim racialization acts differently. 
In Scotland, for example, black youth report that they are regularly mistaken for being 
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Muslim (Hopkins 2017). Such comparisons can help flesh out how religious victimization 
is embedded in a longer history of colonial and imperial racial contexts.
Our findings support others who are increasingly convinced that identity-based hate 
crime categories are inadequate in the US. Victims of hate crimes—like everyone else—
carry multiple and intersecting vulnerabilities. Scholars, drawing on Crenshaw’s (1991) 
concept of intersectionality, have argued that hate crime categorization should emphasize 
a concern for generally “vulnerable” populations rather than single-category identities, 
such as race or sexual preference (Chakraborti 2010, 2015, 2016; Chakraborti and Garland 
2004; Garland 2010, 2012; Mason-Bish 2014; Meyer 2010). We join with critical victi-
mologists who suggest that the corporeality or embodied experiences of victims should be 
the starting point of any such inquiry. Data should be gathered from a general population in 
order to understand how the identities of those who experience bias crimes are constructed 
intersectionally and inter-directionally, including the “gaze” of those who commit violence. 
This means non-Muslims should be incorporated into studies of anti-Muslim victimization, 
and there should be an investigation of whether the categories of “race” and “religion” are 
meaningfully distinct for those who would commit anti-Muslim acts, for example.
Critical criminologists should take seriously the damage done by statistical categories 
that separate racial from anti-Muslim bias acts. This false duality fails to acknowledge the 
racial animus that animates anti-Muslim crimes. By obscuring the racial prejudices that 
shape anti-Muslim victimization, the BJS reifies the notion that Muslims can be seen 
and targeted, thus participating in the false homogenization of a diverse religious faith. 
As such, BJS hate crime statistics are part of the state’s interpellation (Althusser 1971) 
or production of identities that most benefit the state. Failing to acknowledge that Mus-
lims do not look like the racially-specific group of people who are targeted by anti-Muslim 
hatred lends credence to the imagined, racialized enemy in the War on Terror—part of 
the longer history of state-sponsored racism (Ahmed 2012; Haney-Lopez 1996). It is espe-
cially important that criminologists interrupt this interpellation in the emboldened racial 
animus of the Trump era.
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